More on the history of New York’s fracking ban

I accepted a recent assignment for the Press & Sun-Bulletin – recounting how fracking was stopped in New York – with feelings of both eagerness and uneasiness.

Eagerness was due to having a chance to recap the history of a story I have been covering for seven years. The uneasiness stemmed from how I would do this in a newspaper-length article on a 48-hour deadline.

The results ran both in abbreviated and longer versions in the Press & Sun-Bulletin, Pressconnects, and this blog. The long version was 3,700 words -- about 10 times the length of a standard newspaper article. But it was still short considering the scope of the subject. By comparison, I needed more than 90,000 words to tell the story more comprehensively in my book, Under the Surface.

The key players that have shaped New York’ story from the onset number well into the hundreds, and I had space to reference perhaps a dozen in the newspaper piece. Not surprisingly, I have heard feedback from people that my story lacked some perspective. As one source put it, the story of the battle has become the battle for the story.

Two readers touched on particular events relating to a bill, signed by Gov. Paterson in 2008, that was the catalyst for events to follow. The bill would make spacing units for the large unconventional Marcellus gas wells conformable with existing state policy — a move that would effectively streamline the permitting process. Without it, shale gas development would get hung-up on an administrative process designed for the much smaller conventional wells.

The bill was the kind of wonkish-policy instrument that few lay people have the appetite for, and one that induces migraines to reporters writing for mainstream audiences. But it was also the sort of under-the-radar document that offers stakeholders who master it a strategic advantage in influencing important decisions. In this case, it was a necessary component for the gas industry to get things moving in New York. While this policy-making was different from the grass roots aspect of the movement that I report on, the bill ended up being a notable reference point and precursor to the anti-fracking movement.

Although the bill passed overwhelmingly, Assemblywoman Donna Lupardo and a small group of her colleagues voted against, she said, to “send a message to Paterson.” At the same time, she added, “local and statewide activists raised red flags about what this bill would do to speed up the process as well. That helped put the brakes on the whole matter.”

Paterson ordered a hold on permitting pending an environmental review when he signed the bill. But the bill had, for the record, a certain symbolic relevance. More importantly, it was a magnet for organizational involvement in state affairs that, by some accounts, was a forerunner of the anti-fracking movement.

Roger Downs, a program director with the Sierra Club, noted that several environmental organizations were among the first to recognize the significance of this spacing bill, and engage and challenge the DEC about what its impact would be.These groups included the Sierra Club Atlantic Chapter, Catskill Mountainkeeper, Riverkeeper, Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Natural Resources Defense Council, Catskill Center for Conservation and Development, The Wilderness Society and Catskill Citizens for Safe Energy, Damacus Citizens for Sustainability. (I’m sure I am leaving some out.)

Now, moving on to an altogether different thread of the story, Chip Northrup, the drilling-investor-turned-fractivist, offers another critical aspect of the story’s history: economics.

Northrup writes:

We can summarize why fracking was prohibited in New York with a simple construct – the cost/ benefit ratio – what the environmental risks and economic costs would be to the state and it citizens versus the benefits of shale gas industrialization. Initially, this ratio appeared to tilt very much in favor of fracking – at least in the popular press and in the corridors of power – because the gas industry had grossly overstated the benefits of shale gas development while categorically denying the risks and collateral damage associated with it.

You can read Northrup’s full post here.

I am currently finishing an updated version of Under the Surface, Fracking Fortunes and the Fate of the Marcellus Shale, to be published in paperback by for Cornell University Press next year. This will probably be close to 110,000 words. I would like to think, as the subtitle suggests, it covers a lot of ground and offers a pretty good idea of events that distinguish New York from Pennsylvania and the rest of the nation with the unfolding of the on-shore drilling boom. But there will always be more to report. In that spirit, I encourage readers to pass along any of their own stories or recollections.

How Fracking Got Stopped in New York

The following is an uncut version of an article I wrote the Press & Sun-Bulletin. The newspaper version, which ran on Dec. 21, 2014, was cut due to space constraints The full version is reprinted here with permisson of the paper.

One of many protests against fracking in Albany
Photo: James Pitarresi

In certain places in New York, Wednesday’s news of the state’s ban on fracking inspired public celebration.

When a manager at GreenStar Natural Foods Market in Ithaca announced the news over a loud speaker, people in the store began applauding, cheering, shouting and hugging. “People had worked for this for so long,” said Dawn Lodor, an assistant manager at the store, which helped organize opposition to shale gas development.

In pro-fracking camps, the news was met with bitterness and disbelief. Dan Fitzsimmons, head of the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York group, listened to the decision from Cuomo’s cabinet meeting in Albany streamed online to his farmhouse in Conklin. His reaction? “It was like a kick on the gut.” His phone started ringing after that with angry members of the coalition who, in Fitzsimmons words, “feel like they’ve been robbed.”

It was no surprise that the news was emotionally charged. But, for people on both sides of the issue, it was an abrupt endpoint of an epic policy fight that began nearly seven years ago.

New York’s shale gas story will be cast in history as one of false starts, near misses, empty promises, and a grass roots movement of the ages. From the beginning, some harbored great expectations for a shale gas boom in the Southern Tier. In the end it was a bust that never got off the ground.

I began learning the full implications of the shale gas story one day in early May, 2008, when several visitors came to the Binghamton Press & Sun-Bulletin newsroom. These sources included Fitzsimmons, long before he was president of the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, and Tim Whitesell, Town of Binghamton Supervisor. At the time, few people knew what fracking was, and most associated “Marcellus” with a small town in Upstate New York.

Sitting with a group of editors in “the pit” a wall-less space in the corner of the news room with a sunken floor and a white board where editors jotted story ideas, our sources informed us that agents representing gas exploration companies  – “landmen” – were seeking mineral rights to the land in the towns of Conklin and Binghamton. The landmen tended to approach people with the largest tracts first. These were often farmers or descendents of farmers, and many of them were duly skeptical, but excited.  What was not to like about the notion of abundant energy that could be safely extracted from beneath the land with deals that could make people rich? That was what the landowners were told, at least, and that’s what they hoped for.

At that time, land leases for mineral rights were not unusual in parts of New York state, especially in places in western New York where operators, mostly small independent outfits, had drilled wells for generations. In places east of Owego, and the Finger Lakes region, these leases rarely lead to development and the leasing money was incidental – maybe $5 or $10 an acre. Now, we were told by Fitzsimmons, that landmen were offering hundreds of dollars per acre, with some reports of $1,000 or more. The Marcellus Shale – a rock formation long-known to hold an abundance of gas that was technologically inaccessible – was their target. (The Marcellus ran at an angle from Marcellus, New York, where it jutted above ground, all the way to West Virginia and parts of Ohio and Maryland, where it was more than a mile deep.)

Southern Tier residents were learning that the first successful wells in the Marcellus –featuring a combination of new techniques -- had spurned a burgeoning gas rush just across the border in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. Unlike the type of conventional drilling western New Yorkers were familiar with – clusters of vertical wells generally contained in a geographically limited area – this shale gas development involved drilling into rock that extended under entire states. Operations would encompass vast regions. It required unconventional technology. Well bores would be oriented horizontally along the vast mantel of Marcellus rock, and then the bores would be injected with pressurized solutions of unknown but effective chemicals to break the rock and free the gas. The scope, scale, and sums of money were seemingly unprecedented.

For the next six-plus years, the story would be told through several hundred articles in Gannett’s Upstate New York newspapers. It would play out one way in New York, and another way in Pennsylvania, with outcomes that reflect each state’s political attitudes and comfort levels with mineral extraction.

As the price of natural gas approached record highs in early 2008, the fervor over gas development spurred ever more aggressive efforts of landmen charged with securing acreage for drilling. They also fostered growing expectations among landowners seeking a deal of a lifetime. The bidding rose from hundreds of dollars per acre to thousands of dollars per acre, and in the newsroom, we heard complaints from landowners who had signed away their land rights without understanding the value of the mineral resources.

With this concern, early stories seized on the efforts of Chris Denton, an Elmira attorney, and members of the New York Farm Bureau, who became important advocates for landowners. They gave presentations to audiences packing school auditoriums and town halls in places where landmen were sent to secure acreage, which at the height of the leasing frenzy in 2008 included a large part of upstate New York.

Many Southern Tier owners saw the approach of the landmen as a Beverly-Hillbillies–moment. But at his presentations, Denton gave a sobering message: Beware of the industry lease. It’s “a complex-business transaction masquerading as a lottery ticket.” A standard lease was worded in a way that gave operators rights to minerals under their land, of course, but it also gave them rights to do whatever they needed above land to get at riches below.

The state’s permitting guidelines –designed for conventional drilling -- were outdated and insufficient to handle shale gas development. This made matters worse. Landowners had to take matters into their own hands by crafting land-use agreements to ensure environmental safeguards. Denton was the first of several attorneys who would begin advising landowners groups on leasing strategies.

MEGA DEAL

The story went from big to bigger on May 11, 2008 with news from Sanford, a town of 2,400 people on the eastern edge of Broome County. Dewey Decker, town Supervisor, headed a group of 300 farmers – controlling some 50,000 acres – who banded together to leverage bargaining power against companies. None of the landowners would sign a lease without a deal that was acceptable to all. With this technique, the Deposit group landed a deal with XTO Energy for $90 million. That figure would soon grow to $110 million with subsequent sign-ons.

The terms included $2,411 per acre for leasing rights for five years and the same amount for the three-year extension. In addition, if prospectors hit gas, the landowners would get 15 percent of the royalties. Without a single well drilled, many of the farmers, including Decker, made more in a single day than they would their entire lives. Mega deals were also being signed in Pennsylvania, and the media coined a new word for farmers like Decker: Shallionaires.

While the job prospects for rig workers in Pennsylvania remained mostly filled by itinerate crews from Texas and West Virginia, there was a surge of new business for lawyers and accountants. My reporting of the Deposit deal stated it this way: “Now, people who had problems paying property taxes suddenly will have ... more tax problems. Income taxes could immediately bite into a third or more of leasing revenues. ‘It's quite a change, and I hope people can handle it,’ Decker said. ‘The lawyers and accountants are going to make out quite well.’ ”

GREAT EXPECATIONS

News of the XTO deal fueled a gold rush mentality in the Southern Tier.

People began reasoning that, if XTO found resources under the land in the Town of Sanford with that kind of value, then other gas companies prospecting in nearby towns along the Pennsylvania Boarder also harbored riches. Lease offers reported in Broome County towns bordering Pennsylvania soared. In some areas along the Millennium Pipeline, where the market produced a premium for ready access to infrastructure, offers rose to $5,000 an acre or more.

XTO was a $13 billion company that would later be bought out by Exxon Mobil, and a far cry from the smaller independent operators that had done business in New York.  People were rightly filled with a sense that they were heading into unfamiliar territory with the Marcellus prospects, and they began crowding town halls and school auditoriums in their quest for information.

Many of the meetings were sponsored by town officials seeking answers from officials from the state Department of Environmental Conservation about how the impacts from shale gas development would be managed in New York. One such meeting, on July 16, 2008 in the municipal building of the town of Chenango, was crowded with farmers, suburbanites and officials from town, county and state governments. They were not necessarily against fracking, but they had plenty of questions. What about public safety concerns, roads, and waste disposal?

Linda Collart, regional supervisor with the Division of Mineral Resources, assured the crowd that there would be little or no impact; the agency had been managing gas development for generations. In her power point presentation, she showed a picture of what shale gas development would look like: A small valve poking from the ground with a lush meadow of wildflowers and grasses in the foreground an a bank of trees in the background. This was a reclaimed natural gas site, she said, and an example of the expected long-term impact from Marcellus development.

In what would become a defining moment in the local history of the shale play, a person from the back of the room stood up and asked her how local emergency responders could prepare for a spill, fire, or explosion when the industry did not fully disclose the complete chemical content and concentrations of fracking fluids.

“We don’t anticipate any significant emergencies,” Collart said. “These things are rare.”

Another person stood up and asked how regulators were preparing for an influx of drilling that would exceed any historical comparison.

Collart responded, “We have been doing fine so far … No problems!”

Collart stood by that line at several meetings, and the more she gave it, the more agitated and skeptical towns folks became.

A meeting in Greene was scheduled the day after I reported Collart’s responses at the Town of Chenango meeting. For this, Governor David Paterson’s office, responding to growing skepticism about the DEC’s ability to manage shale gas, sent Judith Enck, the governor’s top environmental advisor and Stuart Gruskin, executive deputy DEC commissioner.  As with earlier meetings, the questions reflected frustration from the crowd of more than 500 people who felt they were not getting straight answers, but Enck’s response was different than Collart’s.

“The DEC is going back and doing its homework,” she said. “I’m sure you will hold our feet to the fire and make sure it gets done.”

Later, Gruskin told me that the Greene meeting was a “fork in the road.” He explained: “If there was ever any doubt about the significance of all this, going to that meeting made it clear that it was going to be a really big issue in New York,” he said. “We had to make a decision as to how we were going to approach it.”

Within days of the Greene meeting, the state legislature approved a bill, pushed by gas companies and submitted by the DEC, that would make spacing units for the large Marcellus gas wells more uniform – a move that would effectively streamline the permitting process. Without it, shale gas development would get hung-up on an administrative process designed for the much smaller conventional wells. Paterson signed the industry-supported bill. But, with input from Enck and Gruskin, he also declared that permitting could not begin until the agency under took a comprehensive review of its impacts. The document, know as the Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (or SGEIS) was born.

At the time, even gas supporters didn’t seem to mind the time out, which they saw as a necessary step to make things move smoothly. “It’s a process in which we will be learning as we move forward,” said state Senator Tom Libous, sponsor of the spacing bill. “We have to make sure the environment is protected. I am pleased so far.” At the time, people expected the review to take a year or less, and shale gas would begin soon in New York.

Before the SGEIS could be finalized, it had to go through a public review process. This standard procedure for public policy would make the document a critical instrument for the anti-fracking movement to delay shale gas until people finally got the answers to the questions raised at public meetings. The more they found out, the more questions they had.

A MOVEMENT BEGINS

The second turning point of the story came with a bang, literally, on New Years Day, 2009 in Dimock, Pennsylvana. An explosion rocked the frozen ground in Norma Fiorentino’s front yard and concrete dust billowed over a gaping hole where her water well was housed. The blast destroyed the well that supplied her trailer on her 7-acre homestead. Though there were no casualties, the incident raised many questions and, eventually, led to state and federal investigations about the safety and viability of shale gas development in Susquehanna County. In months and years that followed, the Pennsylvania state Department of Environmental Protection found that methane was seeping from nearby gas wells drilled by Cabot Oil and Gas into water wells in the area where Norma lived. Cabot responded that methane comes from the ground and factors other than drilling can bring it into contact with water supplies. Cabot denied that its operations caused the problem, and at one point accused the DEP of fabricating the story.

The events in Dimock highlighted a battle over whether fracking was a good thing or a bad thing. At the heart of it was the issue of trust, and who could be believed – industry, government, or neither. The industry, at the time, was standing by a claim that fracking had not contaminated a single water well throughout its history. This motivated journalists, critics, and activists who sensed a bending of the facts and possibly a cover up.

After Norma’s well exploded, Walter Hang, head of an environmental research firm in Ithaca, began searching data bases from the DEC to see if he could find records ot similar incidents in New York State. He uncovered 270 files documenting wastewater spills, well contamination, explosions, methane migration and ecological damage related to gas production in the state since 1979. Those findings were the subject of an article in this paper on Nov. 8, 2009. Continuing his research in 2010, Hang uncovered documents that showed William T. Boria, a water resources specialist at the Chautauqua County Health Department, reported his agency had received more than 140 complaints related to water pollution or gas migration associated with nearby drilling operations. In a 2004 memo summarizing the issue, Boria stated: "Those complaints that were recorded are probably just a fraction of the actual problems that occurred." County health officials tabulated information on 53 of the cases from 1983 to 2008 on a spreadsheet, including one where a home was evacuated after the water well exploded.

The first draft of the SGEIS had been released on September 30, 2009, and by then the anti-fracking movement was becoming a powerful grass-roots phenomenon. The first public hearing on the state’s policy proposal to permit shale gas was held six weeks later at the Chenango Valley High School. It had more the feel of a pep rally than a public hearing.

Lines began forming outside an hour before the doors opened at 5:30 p.m. Some people wore costumes—one was a barrel of toxic waste; another, a gas company executive billionaire with money coming out of his hat. They held signs that read “Don’t Frack on Me” and “You Can’t Drink Gas or Money.”

Drilling supporters were also represented, most visibly by people who wore t-shirts that read “Pass Gas, It’s a Movement.”

Environmental conservation officers wearing ranger’s hats and bearing sidearms stood attentively at various entrances and milled about the lobby as more than 1,000 people filled the auditorium to capacity.

For the next three hours, speakers lined up for a turn at the microphone, where they offered impassioned praise or criticism of the drilling industry and its plans to set up shop in Broome County. The meeting in Broome County was one of four throughout the state, and each drew a large and impassioned response.

In the three-month period allotted for written responses, the agency received more than 14,000 formal comments, and it had to address them all before the plan
could become final. The anti-fracking movement won its first and major victory in stalling a decision on shale gas.

CLOSE CALLS

In the years that followed, those who favored shale gas pressed on in the face of even more delays. With the economy languishing for years following the stock market crash of 2008, landowners kindled hopes of making money with gas leases. In northern Pennsylvania and the Southern Tier of New York, tens of thousands of landowners began organizing into dozens of groups to lease their land. Many were organized through Denton and the Farm Bureau, and Binghamton lawyer Scott Kurkoski.

Continued delays and falling natural gas prices did little to deflate expectations. A  study commissioned by the Broome County government in late 2009 found full-scale Marcellus production could involve up to 4,000 wells, generate $14 billion in local spending, and support between 810 and 1,600 new jobs for a decade.

Although the report lacked an assessment of the social and environmental cost, Broome County government budged $5 million in revenues from the gas rush, before it had even signed a lease. Nathaalie Maxwell, budgeted director at the time cited “conservative” expectations for “a multi-billion industry that has set its sights on Broome County.”

At the time, there was still convincing evidence that major companies were interested in extracting gas from under Broome County. In June, 2009, a coalition headed by Dan Fitzsimmons and represented by Scott Kurkoski, announced a deal with Hess that would generate $66.5 million in lease payments and 20 percent royalties for 19,000 acres of land owned by about 700 people.  The deal failed to close, however, due to differences in how the lease would be structured to control land use. Hess eventually signed a deal with residents in Northern Pennsylvania instead.

FATAL BLOWS

After the Hess deal, political, economic, and social factors continued to erode the chances of shale gas development in New York.

The anti-fracking movement would become galvanized in the summer of 2010, with the premier of Josh Fox’s movie, Gasland, on HBO. Gasland, which was screened in Binghamton and Ithaca, featured a shot of Mike Markham, a resident living near shale gas development in Weld County Colorado, lighting his tap water on fire. The movie, which also featured Norma Fiorentino’s well and other scenes from Dimock, Pennsylvania, became a rallying point for the anti-fracking movement in New York.

The SGEIS was sent back to the drawing board, and when the Cuomo administration issued a revision on September 2010, it was again flooded with comments from well-organized and informed critics that led to another backlog.

In years that followed, New York’s anti-fracking movement blossomed into a celebrity cause, supported by performances, rallies, appearances and speeches by Natalie Merchant, Pete Segeer, Mark Ruffalo, Bobby Kennedy Jr., Yoko Ono, Sean Lennon, Josh Fox and others. A group of professionals added credibility to star power. Sandra Steingraber, a noted author, scholar, and ecologist, became a leading figure and motivational speaker. Tony Ingraffea, an engineering professor with vast industry experience, was also a leading influence in the movement and an organizer of Physicians Scientists & Engineers for Healthy Energy.

The fracking debate in New York would extend to both local and federal governments. In 2010, the federal Environmental Protection Agency was directed by Congress to use a portion of its allotted funding for a peer-reviewed study of the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and ground water. The effort -- championed by (now retired) Rep. Maurice Hinchey, at the time chair of the Appropriations Committee -- included a hearing at the Broome County Forum on September 13, 2010. That event drew about 1,500 people from throughout the region. Notably, the EPA hearing was headed by Judith Enck, who had left her job with the DEC to accept appointment as regional director of the EPA. The results of the study are yet to be released.

Yet the biggest defeat for the shale gas industry in New York, prior to Wednesday’s announcement by the Cuomo administration, did not come until late May of this year. That’s when the state’s high court upheld a decision that allowed local governments to control where and if fracking occurred. The concept, know as home rule, was a result of the court’s ruling to uphold fracking bans in the towns of Dryden and Middlefield. Prior to the decision, the state controlled where gas wells went. The Court of Appeals made clear that zoning and land-use restrictions apply, and towns could not proceed without recognizing fracking as an accepted use.  

The decision by the Cuomo administration to ban fracking statewide Wednesday caught everybody by surprise. Hours before it was announced, I was scheduled to cover a town board meeting in Windsor, where officials intended to discuss changes to land use plans to allow fracking. Windsor was one of many towns along the Pennsylvania border going through that process – which was deemed necessary before the state could issue permits. Now, much to the dismay of people like Dan Fitzsimmons, the issue of local control is moot.

Antifracking activists, who were geared up to fight a decision from the governor’s office that would permit fracking, also have to make some adjustments. Dawn Lodor, the manager at GreenStar said the store had commissioned a bus to take fractivists to a rally in Albany in January to protest fracking. They are still going, but now they plan to make it a public celebration.

NY shale prospects dim six years after leasing frenzy Industry faces mounting legal, economic hurdles

New York’s Marcellus Shale gas reserves, once thought to be world class, continue to lose their luster along with the gumption to develop them.

Shale gas proponents, once giddy with anticipation during the leasing boom of 2008, know now what they didn’t know then: legal hurdles to overcome state and local roadblocks look more formidable if not insurmountable with each passing court case and hearing, and the resource looks less and less worth the effort under today’s economics.

Given the inherent uncertainty in mineral exploration, much of the impetus behind it boils down to a mindset. While even some of the most ambitious extraction endeavors go bust, it’s a given that resources buried 5,000 feet deep will not be found where nobody chooses to look. And nobody is going to look if they are not allowed to, or if the effort of looking is deemed greater than the rewards anticipated under any scenario.

Two recent indicators of future prospects in New York have, for the most part, slipped under the radar of the mainstream press, but it’s a reasonable bet they have not escaped notice of prospectors and the people who finance them. The first indicator is the status of a lawsuit by industry and a group of landowners to legally force open the Marcellus frontier in New York. I’ll get to that in a minute. The other indicator is the latest assessment of economically recoverable reserves under current market conditions, if the moratorium were lifted or bypassed.

First the economics. Although it may be a fading memory for many, stakeholders will remember a time when New York was expected to join Pennsylvania as a global energy producer with gas from the Marcellus Shale. Many will recall the summer of 2008, when the leasing frenzy – whipped up by a $110 million deal between XTO Energy and landowners in Deposit, New York – sent lease prices soaring along the relatively unexplored fringes of the Marcellus in the Southern Tier of New York.

Since then, the price of natural gas has fallen by more than two thirds. Moreover, New York state’s moratorium on shale gas development, pending a review originally expected to last a year, is about to begin year seven, with no end in sight. In the meantime prospectors have moved on to other ventures, leaving many to wonder when and if they will return to the Empire State. The answer is simple: They will return when and if a) it’s allowed and b) it’s profitable.

The League of Women voters became interested in the profitability issue when the state released its 2014 Energy Plan, which includes vague references to shale gas development within New York’s borders. To help bring things into focus, the league  commissioned petroleum geologist Arthur Berman and petroleum engineer Lyndon Pittinger to assess the potential of the shale gas under New York state in the context of market viability.

The result, a report titled Resource Assessment of Potentially Producible Natural Gas Volumes from the Marcellus Shale, State of New York, was released last month. It begins with varying projections of the Marcellus Shale potential from credible sources that show, if anything, just how uncertain the starting point of that calculation is and always has been. Estimates of the recoverable reserve range from those posed by Penn State geologist Terry Engelder in 2008 -- 489 trillion cubic feet (tcf), with about 71 tcf under New York stat – to those offered by The United States Geological Society in 2011: 84.2 tcf for the entire Marcellus play extending through Pennsylvania and four other states.

To clear up a point of common confusion, these numbers represent “technically recoverable” gas. As Berman and Pittinger point out, the “economically recoverable” figure, which is more relevant, is bound to be lower. Both figures are moving targets. That which is technically recoverable changes with technological advances; economically recoverable resources change with economy, and specifically with the value of the resource. The  value, in turn, is influenced by supply, demand, and infrastructure to get it to market. All of these things are influenced by regulation, which in New York remains unknown.

In a nut, the League of Women Voters report found that the business of fracking in New York, moratorium aside, would not be viable at today’s price -- between $4 and $4.50 per MMBtu, or Million British Thermal Units. The price would have to rise to $6 per MMBtu to encourage exploration and even then production would be modest -- between the 0.8 and 2.5 Tfc. A price of $8 MMBtu would encourage production between 2 to 9.1 tcf -- more than marginal but hardly the bonanza that people were expecting in 2008. For gas to reach $6 MMBtu, Berman notes, “Substantial unforeseen changes in the natural gas supply/demand balance would need to occur.”

(You can hear Berman discuss his report with Capitol Press Room Host Susan Arbetter here.)

It’s fair to note that Berman has long been a critic of shale gas development, and his projections tend to reflect a broader notion that its economic sustainability falls well short of expectations promoted within the field. But he is respected, and even shale gas proponents such as Engelder, given the chance, show no eagerness to flatly dismiss his assessment of New York. “Art may not be that far off the mark although he is usually low relative to other analyses,” Engelder said in a recent email, asking his take on Berman’s work.  “Maybe some of Broome County works at $4 gas,” Engelder added.

It’s also worth noting that Berman’s analysis draws on and expands the same school of thought developed last year by a team comprised of a cross-section of professionals, led by investor Chip Northrup, who happen to be upstate New York residents and who have been conspicuous in the battle to keep fracking out of their state. The team also includes Lou Allstadt, a retired Mobil vice president, Brian Brock, a geologist, and Jerry Acton, a retired systems engineer for Lockheed Martin. (Here's link to Northrup's blog, No Fracking Way.)

Within days of the release of the report by the League of Women Voters, shale gas proponents suffered another discouragement on the legal front. First, some background: Undaunted by a string of defeats in state court that have consistently ruled in favor of municipalities’ rights to ban drilling, a legal team representing landowners and industry filed a suit against New York that claims the indefinite moratorium on shale gas development violates the state’s own policy under the State Environmental Quality Review Act. The state filed a motion for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiffs had suffered no damages and the moratorium fell well within the state’s right in establishing policy on shale gas, regardless of how long it took to review all the factors.

The complaint was filed by the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, represented by Scott Kurkowski and funded by the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a group founded by the Koch brothers to fund conservative legal causes. A companion suit was filed by industry lawyer Tom West on behalf of Mark Wallach, a trustee of Norse Energy, a bankrupt drilling company with interests in upstate New York. Morgan Costello of the attorney general’s office provided council for the state.

On April 24, both sides appeared in a hearing before state Supreme Court Judge Roger McDonough. It’s often tough to tell the outcome of a case based on a hearing and prior to a ruling, but by all counts, the judge seemed to lack sympathy for the landowners, and pressed them on the merits of their complaint against the state. Here’s an excerpt from an account posted April 26 on the Joint Landowners website:

Judge McDonough asked if the executive branch can delay forever. Ms. Costello’s answer was that it can take extended time. Judge McDonough seemed to agree with Ms. Costello on the executives role, calling it “separation of powers 101.”

Attorney Tom West for Norse spoke next. The Judge focused on time limits in SEQRA. There are none. He suggested that this should be remedied in the legislature or in the executive branch. As Attorney West kept hammering at the history of delay and the ongoing wrong, the Judge said that he can only take the executive on its word at this stage of the process. (Editor’s note: Motive will emerge in discovery, but we have to get past the motion to dismiss in order to get to discovery.) The Judge sympathized with the frustration but kept returning to time limits in the law.

The blog concluded optimistically that the “judge reserved decision” and though he did not recognize the fracking moratorium as an “illegal delay” under the state’s SEQR policy, there may be an opening for an argument of “unreasonable delay.”

That optimism was not shared by West. In a recent email in response to my query about the status of the case, West was blunt:  “We are not expecting a positive decision based upon the way that oral argument went.” The West Law firm took down the links to the complaints once posted on its website.

While the jury is still out, so to speak, there is little good news based on these recent events for those counting on a near-term future in shale exploration and development in New York, and plenty of good news for those hoping to see New York lay the groundwork to establish itself as an alternative energy trend-setter.

But the story is not that simple, of course, with plot lines extending well beyond New York, and woven deeply into the national and global circumstances that will determine the future of fracking. Those plots are quickly evolving.

One example: The U.S. Energy Information Administration has just cut its estimates of recoverable reserves in the Monterey Shale in California by 96 percent. California, like New York, is politically influential, and it’s hard to ignore other similarities regarding their roles in the fracking saga. In California, the notion that the geology cannot support the hype has enlivened the argument that the fracking bonanza was a bust from start, and has encouraged legislation for a moratorium similar to New York’s.

But while shale gas prospects are dimming in New York and California, they are getting a big push from places inbetween as well as other parts of the world. Global forces are encouraging development of gas reserves in dozens of other U.S. states to capitalize on growing international demand for cheap and readily available fuel sources, with the economic and political equation favoring expediency over externalized costs. Those demands, already substantial and growing in Asia, have spiked in Europe. The age-old call for energy independence is again taking on a new urgency in the Free World, with the Ukraine crises vividly illustrating the danger of energy dependence on unpredictable and unfriendly governments – in this case, Russia.

Many think more gas from the U.S. and a global spread of the fracking gospel is the answer. Michael Lindenberger of the Dallas Morning News, recently reporting on the significance of a deal for Russia to strengthen it’s economic status with a $400 billion deal to export gas to China, cited Texas Senator John Cornyn as characterizing the broad political push for policy to encourage more U.S. exports. More exports, according to Cornyn, make economic sense but, moreover, are justified “because of the competition it would provide for Putin and the Russian monopoly.”

Of course, we are talking about shale gas and fracking, so it comes as no surprise that there is little consensus and much division on the topic. Seamus McGraw, author of End of County, Dispatches from the Frack Zone, has been following the fracking issue since he began writing his book as the shale gas boom first developed in Pennsylvania. He points out that the global economics of shale gas cannot be isolated from the economics of other energy sources, including coal. The political urgency provoked by international threats in areas involving key American interests must account for the practicalities of various solutions. And a primary practicality  of shale gas exports involves infrastructure in place to get energy where it needs to go today, not years from now. And here I will give McGraw the last word. In a recent discussion on my Facebook page, he posted:

You're not going to break Russia's stranglehold (on natural gas exports) because a) they've got pipelines which beat LNG (liquid natural gas) every time, and b) because they can set the price as low as they want to drive us out of market and then jack it back up at will. All this is going to do is drive up prices here to the point that gas may no longer be reliably competitive with coal, choke off any ancillary economic benefits to manufacturing, and concentrate what advantages there are entirely in the industry itself. And even that, as the Russia/China deal demonstrates, isn't going to be nearly as lucrative as the industry imagines. It's a bad deal all around.

Ultimately, global markets along with political considerations will shape the deal, good or bad, and determine whether the value of gas in places like New York ever justifies the costs of extracting it.

Paper trail for Pa. shale waste leads to ex-IBM site in NY Official dismisses DEP record of cuttings shipped upstate

A delivery arrives in the village of Endicott, NY last summer
Photo: NY Friends of Clean Air and Water

ENDICOTT, NY -- An issue over what – exactly -- is arriving in tanker trucks for disposal at a manufacturing plant in Endicott, New York is a recent and vivid example of the fear and uncertainty over the endpoint of waste produced by the shale gas industry, and the lack of regulatory wherewithal to track it.

It’s a matter of record with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation that the tanker trucks in question are importing more than 80,000 gallons of waste a day to the plant in the heart of the village. That sum includes 30,000 gallons of leachate from the Seneca Meadow’s landfill, and 50,000 gallons from the Broome County landfill. But there is much that is not on the record, and I will get to that in a moment. First, some background.

Leachate is the soluable and suspended matter that percolates through landfills with (in this area) 30 inches of rain each year, plus whatever moisture is in the landfill itself. This drainage includes essentially anything that goes into the landfill that can be flushed out with water. Put another way, Leachate consists of landfill dregs.

Municipal sewage treatment plants are generally not equipped to handle landfill leachate, so it’s shipped to commercial plants designed to treat industrial waste. The sprawling manufacturing campus in Endicott, in the middle of a heavily populated retail and residential area of the village, was once home to IBM Corp’s micro electronic division .The industrial park, now owned by Huron Real Estate, includes a plant that has been treating waste produced from onsite operations for decades.

The most recent imports are a new source of income for the current operators, i3 Electronics. They began arriving conspicuously last year from Seneca Meadows landfill in 18-wheel tanker trucks rolling through the village. At that time, the business was owned by EIT, which eventually fell to bankruptcy. Along with the tanker trucks came suspicion and fear that former and current operators of the business are trying to offset steady manufacturing losses and job declines over the years with revenue from waste imports.

The suspicion is not without justification. As far as state regulators are concerned, the plant is processing this new source of landfill waste, without a permit, as part of a pilot study. But no time frame has been allocated, and no public comment period or public notification has been declared. According to Mary Jane Peachey, a regulator with the state Department of Environmental Conservation, the DEC has not monitored the input or output of the plant in at least five years.

And here is another critical piece of background: The i3 Electronics site and the surrounding residential and retail district is a Class 2 state Super Fund site, meaning existing pollution there poses a “significant threat to public health or the environment.” Since 1979, IBM Corp. has been pumping toxic solvents from the ground that have seeped from the micro-electronics plant into the community, affecting more than 470 homes. There have been multiple spills since.

It is no surprise that Endicott residents are generally concerned about becoming a waste destination, and specifically concerned about waste from shale gas development, which have been banned in New York pending a health review.

Much of the controversy over fracking waste involves the chemical solution that goes into shale gas wells to stimulate production, and the liquid mix of brine, chemicals and metals that comes out. But liquid waste – called flowback – is just one part of a broader metric. Shale gas development also involves a viscous solution called drilling mud, and solid waste, including drill cuttings tinged with varying degrees of metals, solvents, and naturally occurring radio active material (NORM) from deep in the ground. It’s a matter for record that drilling cuttings from the Marcellus Shale tend to be radioactive, and the New York State Department of Health has advised officials from the DEC to devise a testing protocol to ensure hot drilling waste is handled and disposed of properly .

Drill cuttings, like flowback, are also exempt from federal hazardous waste handling laws, and they often end up in landfills, like Seneca Meadows.

And that’s how shale gas dregs can end up Endicott, or countless other places where landfill leachate is treated. The shipping of leachate to private plants is not, in itself, sinister, or even especially newsworthy. It’s the exemptions, loopholes, and lack of disclosure about its contents that makes it a problem and rightly invites the attention of activists and media watchdogs.

According to records filed with the state Department of Environmental Protection, the Seneca Lake Meadows landfill was the final destination for Marcellus Shale drill cuttings from 196 wells drilled in Pennsylvania during 2010 and 2011. After tracking this bit of information down on their own, some Endicott residents and area activists wanted to know if this potentially radio active drilling waste stream ended in Endicott via the importation of Seneca Meadows leachaete. If so, were state regulators aware of it?

And that brings us to the part of the story where the record gets muddy.

A citizens group called the Western Broome Environmental Stakeholders Coalition met with the DEC’s Peachey in February to get to the heart of the matter. (A video of the meeting, filmed by activist Bill Huston, is available here.) Early in the meeting, the question came up as to whether the Seneca Meadows leachate arriving in Endicott was tested for radioactivity – a simple question that apparently invited a very confusing answer.

Peachey said that step is unnecessary, unless agency personal “are aware” that the waste comes from a suspected radioactive source. “When we are aware that someone is taking a waste stream that would have those elements we would require them to do appropriate sampling and monitoring for that,” she explained.

When a resident pointed out that Seneca Meadows takes Marcellus drill cuttings, Peachey challenged the source of that information. “If they were taking fracking waste now I think we would know it,” she said. When told that the information came directly from the Pennsylvania DEP database, Peachy replied: “I would question that ... I would like to substantiate that more with what’s currently going on there.”

DEP records show that Peachey is technically correct. Seneca Meadows is not currently taking waste from shale gas wells. But she failed to tell the group – in a meeting that was purportedly intended to inform the public and set the record straight – that the Pennsylvania record also shows the landfill did accept cuttings from nearly 200 wells over a two-year period. In bureaucratic form, Peachey fixated on timing and semantics while ignoring the essence of the matter.

While Peachey’s response could be explained as an attempt to disarm a source of PR headaches for the agency, it did nothing to address the issue at hand: drill cuttings in the Seneca Meadows landfill and their influence on the leachate. And it circumvented the original question – is the leachate from that landfill being checked for radioactivity as it rolls into Endicott?

The answer (as eventually revealed – sort of) is no, and perhaps there is a good reason that it is not. (Addressing a later question from the audience, Peachey explained that it is up to landfill operators to check for radio-activity.) But Peachey’s failure to acknowledge, much less explain, the record of shipments of cuttings from Pennsylvania gas wells to Seneca Meadows does not inspire trust. The error of omission could be a misguided attempt for damage control. Or it might be evidence that the department is out of the loop in what she pointed out was a “transaction between one private company to another private company.”

Another possibility, no more reassuring, is that the Pennsylvania records are untrustworthy. Before gaining access to the DEP website, visitors must agree to this disclaimer that notes that the data is self-reported, unchecked, unverified, and possibly incomplete:

DEP makes no claims, promises or guarantees regarding the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the operators’ data that DEP is required to post. DEP expressly disclaims any liability for errors or omissions related to the production data contained within these reports. No warranty of any kind is given by DEP with respect to the production data contained within these reports posted on its website.

All of this uncertainty points to an overarching problem: the industry’s exemption from federal laws that mandate a clear tracking and specific kind of handling of hazardous waste. States are left with that job, and more often than not, state officials – citing a lack of resources -- defer to the industry to get the job done.

The issue of where the waste goes, which I have written about in several posts, is especially pressing these days, as tens of thousands of shale gas wells come on line in Pennsylvania and Ohio, and tens of thousands more elsewhere in the country.In the absence of federal hazardous waste laws and lack of regional planning, placing the waste becomes a process of default as various states consider legislation to ban it. (New Jersey legislators are crafting a second attempt at a ban after the first was vetoed by Gov. Chris Christie, and the issue is also being considered in New York and Connecticut.) Hence, rather than guided by a master plan, the waste is following the path of least social and political resistance. Much of what comes from the Marcellus, as far as we can tell from industry’s self policing records, goes to injection wells in Ohio, and various landfills and private treatment plants in Pennsylvania and New York.

In addition to Seneca Meadows, DEP records show that New York destinations for waste from the Marcellus Shale include Hyland in Angelica, the Hakes Landfill in Painted Post, the Chemung Landfill near Elmira, Seneca Meadows Landfill in Waterloo and the Allied/BFI Waste Systems landfill in Niagara Falls.

Communities like Niagara Falls (and notably Love Canal) tied to a history of toxic waste disposal are especially sensitive to the possibility of a future tied to more of the same. Even though the Buffalo area does not sit over a viable shale reserve, I have found during book signings there that community members are keenly attuned to the issues of shale gas development and, specifically, the lack of assurances about its waste stream.

Endicott is also one of those places. People in the village are angry that they were not notified about waste imports to the i3 Electronics plant. Matters were made worse last year when a corroded tank holding the contents of a Seneca Meadows shipment failed and at least 6,000 gallons of leachate spilled out, much if it soaking into the ground. Residents were not informed of the shipments or the spill. They were left piecing together information until a year later, when John Okesson, Peachey’s colleague at the DEC, explained details at the February meeting after sustained community pressure for the agency to account for it.

Rick White, a community member and labor advocate, summed up feelings at the end of the meeting. He referred to decades of spills, a pattern of secrecy, and a resulting legacy of environmental problems that, in his words, “stack up.” He continued:

This whole community is very sensitive to the idea that if there is additional toxic fluid, whether it is fracking waste or landfill waste or whatever it might be, and it’s coming into the village of Endicott for whatever the reason, whether it’s to make money or to enrich somebody’s pockets or it its simply to do a good service to the community, the negatives outweigh the positives. And this is why we are asking these questions.

His comments were met with applause from the 50 or so people in attendance.

Trespassing case tests driller’s control over leased land Activist banned from parks, schools, stores w/ Cabot lease

Vera Scroggins in front of a drilling rig in Dimock Township
PHOTO JAMES PITARRESI

After being charged with trespassing, anti-fracking Vera Scroggins has been banished from land leased by Cabot Oil & Gas. That’s no small deal. The Texas drilling company has leases on more than 200,000 acres -- nearly 40 percent -- of Susquehanna County where Scroggins lives, including rights to property of friends, neighbors, stores, parks and schools.

The Cabot v. Scroggins trespassing case might have been relegated to a journalistic footnote in a national conflict over shale gas development and high volume hydraulic fracturing. It has long been standing practice (and common sense) for companies to restrict access to operations where crews are using heavy equipment and hazardous chemicals under high pressure to drill wells and fracture bedrock a mile deep in the ground.

Scroggins admittedly crossed into designated work areas on occasion, but there were no signs denoting trespass zones, she said, and her ventures into drilling territory in each case were in good faith to openly ask questions and seek information. (Some background on this in a moment.) The remarkable and possibly groundbreaking aspect of this case, however, is not the charge or the defense, but the resulting preliminary injunction the Susquehanna Court of Common Pleas issued on October 21, 2013. Pending trial of the case this spring, the order forbids Scroggins from setting foot on land owned or leased by Cabot, “including but not limited to” well sites, well pads, and access roads. That language, interpreted by Scroggins lawyer Gerald Kinchy, in effect forbids Scroggins from going to certain school grounds, her auto mechanic of 23 years, many other businesses, the county jail, and homes of dozens of friends, among other places. Doing so puts her at risk of contempt of court. (See the full order, embedded below.)

Cabot’s action raises the broader issue of how much control energy companies have over land they lease. While mineral extraction is their stated intention, many standard leases give companies ill-defined and seemingly limitless discretion over land use. “When drilling companies lease rights to land for mineral extraction,” Kinchy said, “does that mean they have rights to exclude other people from that land, even property owners?”

Apart from the Scroggins case, that question has mostly applied to practical matters of daily extraction operations. A company such as Cabot might own rights to a large tract, but it is generally concerned about gaining or restricting access to active work areas. Conflicts might crop up over where exactly a company might build a pad, access road, or pipeline, and at what inconvenience or loss of land use to the landowner. When that happens, lease language and the respective parties’ appetite and resources for litigation come into play, with the company often in a position of leverage.

The Scroggins case breaks new ground. Issues of practicality (and enforcement) aside, it probes whether a company can legally keep a person from stepping foot on leased land outside of established work zones, including public spaces where others are allowed.

Now for some background. Cabot Oil & Gas operations have drawn numerous violations from the state and much national and international media coverage due to recurring water pollution problems in Dimock Township. The company has been a particular target for critics and activists, including Scroggins, who lives in the neighboring township of Brooklyn. (More about that here.)

In Under the Surface, I describe Scroggins this way:

 … a grandmother, amateur videographer, and advocate for many causes, including home births, home schooling, and no mandated childhood vaccinations. In 2009, she took up the cause as a watchdog against oil and gas operators who began leasing large tracts of northeast Pennsylvania to develop the Marcellus Shale. “We’re extra eyes and ears for the DEP,” she told [a community organizer]. “They don’t have enough workers and we have to pick up the slack.”  

Footage from some of Vera’s vigilante patrols in 2009 shows encounters with roughnecks and pipeline workers, some reacting with amusement or annoyance to the woman with a home video camera showing up at these remote and often inaccessible work sites and peppering them with questions. Some called her “ma’am” and briefly addressed her questions; some directed her to the foreman, who almost always asked her to leave; and some simply ignored her or walked away. These brief encounters typically punctuate long unedited footage of vacuum trucks, excavation equipment, and hay bales. Vera also taped public forums and interviews with residents … recounting their experiences with gas development. These videos she posted online, where they joined a broad and growing collection of depictions of Susquehanna County gas development by other independent media, advocates … and professional news outlets. They generally … presented aspects of drilling that lent themselves to visuals: truck traffic, derricks, flaring, fracking, and heavy machinery cutting swaths through the countryside.

Until the injunction, Vera had intensified her efforts, serving as a tour guide for parties interested in seeing and learning about drilling and fracking from a perspective other than that offered by company tours and commercials. On occasion, she has helped me locate operations in the region (viewable from  public roads.)

Cabot poses a sound argument that those venturing onto work sites without permission pose an annoyance, distraction, and/or safety threat. But Vera’s presence has become iconic of another kind of threat to the company – bad public relations and control over its image. The scope of the injunction against Scroggins invites wonder whether Cabot attorneys who crafted the language were unintentionally imprecise, or whether they are testing a strategy to eliminate their Scroggins PR headache once and for all, while sending a message to other activists.

George Stark, a company spokesman, was unavailable to answer this and other questions.

Court Order 10-22-13 New Date 1 2 14 Next Court Day by Thomas Wilber

Will Utica, Marcellus remain non-starters in Empire State? New theory holds geology, not politics, thwarts NY fracking

Cabot Oil & Gas Map showing thickness of Marcellus shale, one measure

of it's viability. Other factors include depth, organic content,

thermal maturity, and myriad political and market factors    

A collection of factors stalled the Pennsylvania shale gas rush at the New York state border, including grass roots opposition, a market glut, the threat of local bans and --  above all -- the state’s reluctance to complete permitting guidelines without more information about health impacts. That, at least, is the familiar version of the story recounted through the popular press. But a group of activists – some uniquely qualified – are building an argument that something more profound and fundamental is at work: A lack of gas.

“Simply put, we now know that the Marcellus is likely only marginally productive in a few townships by the border - and may not be economic there until after 2020,” said Chip Northrup. “The Utica may not be here at all - or in a few pockets.”

Next week, Northrup, a former oil and gas investor from Texas, will publically make this case along with a select group of anti-fracking activists, some with industry resumes. The event is scheduled for 7 p.m. at Cornell University’s Hollister Hall Auditorium. In addition to Northup, presenters will include Lou Allstadt, a retired senior vice president for Mobil Oil, Jerry Acton, a systems analyst for Lockheed Martin, and Brian Brock, a retired geologist. The event will be moderated by Tony Ingraffea, a Cornell engineering professor specializing in fracturing mechanics that are integral to shale gas production.

The argument isn’t really about whether there is gas under New York – geologists agree that multiple gas-bearing formations, conventional and otherwise, lie beneath upstate’s countryside from the Catskills to the Allegany region. It’s a question of whether the broad mantels of Devonian shale, which hold prospects of drilling, fracking, and infrastructure development on an unprecedented scale, are economically viable under current or future market conditions.

Interest in New York’s unconventional reserves peaked in 2008, when the price of natural gas was three to four times higher than it is now. Since then, production of Marcellus wells coming on line in Pennsylvania and West Virginia has soared, contributing to a price collapse that is not forecast to change anytime soon. While this is a contributing factor, Northrup argues that the much-hyped future for shale gas as an economic engine for New York was a bust from the start. The team of presenters next week at Cornell will base this outlook both on analysis of available geological records and the status of leasing and development trends by major oil and gas companies. So far, only one major, Exxon Mobil, holds significant leases in New York – 50,000 acres in Broome and Delaware counties, near the Pennsylvania border. Moreover, Northrup said, analysis of well data filed with the DEC shows a range of major companies including Chevron, Gulf and others, tested upstate reserves prior to the “the fury” of the gas rush unfolded in 2008. “They kicked the tires and left well before the moratorium was in place,” he said.

Since the moratorium preventing high volume hydraulic fracturing began in the summer of 2008, midsize companies have faired poorly in their shale gas quest in New York. Norse Energy, a Norwegian company, was planning to tap Marcellus reserves in Oneida and Chenango counties. But officials recently announced they will close operations that remain insolvent after the company’s failure to sell pipeline rights of way and gas leases on 130,000 acres to pay debts. Chesapeake Energy, meanwhile, is letting its leases in New York expire after losing a legal battle to extend them indefinitely (through a process called force majeure) while waiting out the resolution to the state’s moratorium. Prior to that, Talisman, a Canadian company that was a big player in New York’s Trenton Black River boom, began shifting it’s operations from conventional resources in New York to Pennsylvania’s shale gas.

Interest from major oil companies is one of multiple measures of shale gas prospects, and it is not always a defining one. As Russell Gold recently reported for the Wall Street Journal, majors have not typically thrived in the natural gas business, and Shell Oil is selling off some assets in Texas after suffering from a market glut that has held prices down to below $4 per thousand cubic feet for several years. The industry moves in cycles, however, along with prices and demand, and independents play an important if not critical role in exploring resources that might otherwise go undiscovered as business cycles ebb and flow. Gold explains:

Smaller producers have tended to be more successful in shale than major oil companies, in part because they can move more quickly to lease up acreage before land prices rise and are more nimble at experimenting with different well designs to maximize output and drive down unit costs.

In short, smaller independents commonly venture where majors don’t. There is a lower barrier of entry to leasing, exploring, and experimenting in unproven areas, and rewards of discovery are greater. So are the risks.

This is a concern for Allstadt, who has led the push for a precedent-setting municipal ban (now being tested before the state’s high court) on drilling in Cooperstown. He has told me he does not generally fear the work of major oil companies, but he is wary of wildcatters – independents with limited capital who live or die in the world of speculative ventures. “They (Independents) play on the fringes,” Allstadt said. “They are the ones most likely to screw things up.” (Drillers have already left a legacy in upstate New York. Regulators estimate there are 57,000 abandoned and orphan oil and gas wells statewide, many of them left by firms that went broke or walked away from them.  Of these, the state has listed 4,722 as a priority due to health and safety risks, but lacks funding to plug them.  More on that here.)

In addition to a market evaluation, Northup said the presenters at Cornell will offer geological data that shows underwhelming results for shale gas samples collected from wells drilled in the 1990s and the early part of this century targeting conventional formations – mostly the Trenton Black River. Operators had to drill through the Utica and Marcellus to get to the Trenton Black River, which provided a small boom of its own when natural gas prices began rising several decades ago. The Marcellus is generally thought to be too thin and too close to the surface to be effectively developed in western New York, where most of the Trenton wells are drilled. But some geologists have argued that the prime drilling fairway of the Utica shale, which is providing productive wet gas and oil wells in eastern Ohio, may overlap the Trenton fields in western New York. Northup argues the opposite. “If those had shown Utica potential, all the majors would be here - and they never were,” he said. Take into account these factors, plus limitations imposed by natural barriers, topography, and regional no-drilling zones the state has imposed for ecological reasons, the much-touted drilling fairway for shale gas extending into New York’s Southern Tier “looks more like a putting green,” Northrup quipped on a recent appearance on Liz Benjamin’s Capital Tonight.

Terry Engelder is a geologist from Penn State whose career has been defined by his knowledge of Devonian shale. In a series of calculations in 2008 and 2009, he estimated that the Marcellus contained enough recoverable gas – nearly 500 trillion cubic feet -- to last decades, and his very public encouragement to investors and the media served as a catalyst to the gas rush in Pennsylvania. Now, with prices a fraction of what they were, Engelder is cautious about assessing the economic breakeven point of New York’s shale reserves, which, he said, “need careful evaluation.” In an email this week, he responded to my requests to assess the validity of claims by Northrup’s team that New York’s reserves are too small and problematic to be worthwhile.

Now it may turn out that shale gas in New York will not work for less than, say, $5.00/MMcf, BUT the the state should thoroughly evaluate this possibility and not have a bunch of born-again anti-frackers shout the industry down before sensible geologists and engineers really understand what the possibilities are.  

His dismissal with the anti-fracking movement aside, Engelder’s cautionary theme is a contrast to brimming enthusiasm he expressed along with lawyers, elected officials, landowners, and landmen that reflected a sense of giddiness over prospects of the shale gas boom in 2008. Interest in New York peaked in the summer of 2008, after a coalition of landowners near the Pennsylvania border landed a deal with XTO Energy (later bought by Exxon Mobil) to open 50,000 acres for development for $110 million plus royalties. Although that acreage remains undeveloped due to the moratorium, Engelder’s estimates were supported by production figures as the shale gas rush took shape in Pennsylvania over the next few years. By early 2009 drilling proponents in Pennsylvania and New York began looking for political leverage to encourage government support of the industry. As the economy sunk into recession, the case for jobs seemed to be the hot button. Stakeholder-funded studies purported to show economic potential that, in retrospect, stretch the limits of good sense in some cases.  An enthusiastic Broome County legislature paid University of North Texas scholars for a study that concluded Broome County was “fortunately located in the epicenter of the play” and shale gas development would produce 4,000 wells that would bring $15 billion to the economy, create 16,000 jobs, generate $792 million is salaries and $85 million in tax revenue.  The study encouraged county officials – before a single well was drilled or land leased -- to budget $5 million of expected lease payments on county-owned land near the landfill. Five years later, the county is yet to collect a dime from its shale gas assets, whatever they may be.

Engelder’s predictions remain controversial. And while early production numbers in Pennsylvania have met and in some cases exceeded them, questions about production have given way to questions about sustainability. (Will Bunch, of the Philadelphia Daily news, explores unmet expectations in Pennsylvania’s gas rush here, and Kevin Begos, of the Associated Press, looks at the concern of pension fund managers over the long-term profitability of the industry here.)

Chris Denton, an attorney who represents landowner coalitions, has seen the rise and fall of gas prices and corresponding interest in shale gas leases in New York. He pointed out that geological assessments are unique, piecemeal, and often proprietary, so it’s hard to usefully extrapolate figures from conventional wells, many which are in western New York, to the parts of the Marcellus shale thought to have the greatest potential, which are more toward the east. “I don’t really pay much attention unless it’s hard data from wells,” said Denton, who added that there is no mystery to why shale gas has not taken off in New York while it’s flourishing just across the boarder in Pennsylvania. “We’ve spoken with a lot of interested parties, and as it stands, it’s really too easy for them to go someplace else. They tell us, ‘call us after the moratorium’s been lifted.’”

For every argument against shale gas, it’s easy to find a countervailing argument. Theories about the geology in New York bring a chicken-or-egg quality to the discussion. Denton says the geology has not been proven because of the moratorium. Northup says the lack of interest – based on available geological data -- makes it politically comfortable for Governor Andrew Cuomo to extend the moratorium indefinitely.

The argument for or against the geology aside, there are new signs that Northrup has correctly pegged the political atmosphere. In an interview earlier this week in the Syracuse Post Standard, DEC Commissioner Joe Martens told reporter David Figura the health review needed to complete the state’s permitting policy is “going to take some time… We really don’t feel that there is any great urgency. People really want to be satisfied that this can be done safely and that's what [Department of Health Commissioner] Dr. Shah is trying to get to the bottom of.”

Will the geology of New York support a full-scale gas development by major energy companies or even speculative exploration by wildcatters? For now, a number of influences – including markets, political pressures, and unproven geology -- have created a feedback loop that favors the status quo.

NY Appellate Court upholds Home Rule fracking ban Landmark case critically linked to Marcellus development

New York’s anti-fracking movement scored a critical victory today in a landmark case testing the right of local governments to ban fracking.

In a much-anticipated decision, the state’s Third Appellate Division upheld a ruling  giving local governments authority to ban the controversial practice of unconventional drilling and well-stimulation techniques – including high volume hydraulic fracturing -- to extract petroleum from bedrock.

Today’s ruling comes after the shale gas industry appeal of a February, 2012 decision by a lower court favoring the right of local governments to ban drilling. The appeal was based on an argument that legislation amending the Oil Gas and Solutions Minding Law gave the state, not local governments, exclusive jurisdiction over wells.

In today’s appellate court ruling, the three-judge panel unanimously agreed that the oil and gas law did not reflect legislative intent to “pre-empt a municipality’s power to enact a local zoning ordinance banning all activities related to the exploration for, and the production or storage of, natural gas and petroleum within its borders.”

This theme was reiterated emphatically throughout the 15-page ruling:

We find nothing in the language, statutory scheme or legislative history of the (Mining Law) statute indicating an intention to usurp the authority traditionally delegated to municipalities to establish permissible and prohibited uses of land within their jurisdictions. In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to preempt local control over land use, we decline to give the statute such a construction.

Industry attorney Tom West said his legal team will file for an appeal, but it is up to the discretion of the state’s high court whether to hear the case.

Home Rule bans are supported by activists who fear shale gas development, including the use of high volumes of undisclosed chemical solutions injected into the ground to fracture shale and release gas – poses unacceptable threats to environment and public health. Activists praised the court’s decision to uphold local bans, while using the victory to encourage broader opposition.

“The real solution to this problem is for the state to ban fracking, but until that happens, local governments have a responsibility to protect their citizens from the oil and gas industry,” Kelly Branigan said in a statement. Branigan is a founding member of Middlefield Neighbors and a member of New Yorkers Against Fracking. Residents of the towns of Middlefield and Dryden supported the bans, which were legally challenged by Anschutz Exploration and Norse Energy.

The Marcellus and Utica shalea, some of the largest gas reserves in the world, extend throughout Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio. Today’s ruling could have a profound impact on the future of shale gas development in the Empire State. Unlike conventional gas development, which tends to be geographically limited, the footprints of shale gas resources cover large regions. Uncertainty over jurisdiction from one town to the next can be a critical disincentive for drillers. Absent a successful appeal, according to West, the prospects of large scale shale gas development in New York are dim.  “This sends a signal to the industry that New York is not stable,” he said. “You can invest millions of dollars to lease in New York and be at the mercy of a 3-2 town hall vote.”

Which is exactly why grass roots activist like it. Local control of the gas industry is a “David and Goliath battle,” said Branigan. “This decision shows that our democracy in New York State still works.”

Permitting for gas wells in New York has been on hold for five years, pending the outcome of a policy review by the state Department of Environmental Conservation accounting for environmental and health impacts. That review, called the Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS) has no timetable for completion, Department of Health Commissioner Nirav Shah said yesterday.

The battle continues, and shale gas development is still a real possibility in certain parts of the state despite today’s ruling. There are municipalities that support gas development, including many in Southern Tier counties that are adjacent to productive gas fields in Pennsylvania. If shale gas development were to begin in New York, it would be here, according to a plan floated by Governor Mario Cuomo last year.  The incentive to develop these areas in Broome, Tioga and Delaware counties are strong, because the geology is promising, they are close to major pipelines, and there is relatively little opposition from local town boards.

Small Town USA embodies big time fracking issues in NY Governments face challenges over free speech, land rights

The Town of Sanford, N.Y., population 2,400, sits in the Delaware River watershed in the foothills of the western Catskill region. If you want to get a close up look at the moral and legal complexity of the shale gas debate, Sanford and neighboring towns and villages to the west are a good place to start. The issues pitting neighbor against neighbor here extend beyond economics and environmentalism to broad ideological interpretations of freedom.

Conflict over what can be said or can’t be said at a town board meeting, and whether the state is interfering with landowners’ rights to extract assets from their properties embody monumental questions about Constitutional rights surfacing with the shale gas story. With New York’s moratorium on shale gas development pending an environmental review in its fifth year, these interwoven conflicts are heading to court for disentanglement.

The tension between rights to exploit resources versus rights to be protected against exploitation is a familiar theme in the extraction industry, and I will get to the latest develop on that in a minute. A fight over citizens’ rights to talk about these issues at a town meeting, on the other hand, is a unique wrinkle in the shale gas debate, at least in the town of Sanford, which is on the front line of the controversy.



As recounted in Under the Surface, Sanford is the place where Town Supervisor Dewey Decker organized landowners to form a group to collectively negotiate terms to lease land during the height of the shale gas boom in 2008. The coalition of several hundred landowners agreed to a deal with XTO Energy (now part of Exxon Mobile) to lease 50,000 acres for $110 million (plus 13.5 percent royalties). The terms made many farmers, including Decker, millionaires before a well was drilled. It also served as a wake up call to the rest of the state about the stakes being put into play with shale gas development.

Since then, Sanford has been in the middle of the controversy, owing partly to its position on the edge of the New York City watershed and partly due to the money on the table that reflects the value of natural gas deposits in both the Utica and Marcellus shales underlying the region. Activists from both local and regional anti-fracking groups have made the Town of Sanford and the broader Catskill region a strategic part of their efforts to ban high volume hydraulic fracturing and, consequently, shale gas development.

In September, members of the Sanford Town Board, apparently fed up with the fracking debate, passed a resolution banning further discussion of the matter during the public comment period at town meetings. Town officials with significant financial stakes in shale gas development, meanwhile, have not been silent. Acting in the capacity of Town Supervisor (rather than landowner), Decker sent a letter to Gov. Andrew Cuomo three days before the town ban urging the state to expedite the pending health and environmental review of shale gas development, and complaining that a delay was “only empowering opponents.” Prior to that, the board passed a resolution urging the state to move forward, and rejecting calls for the town to ban fracking.

The board surely has a right to take a position, but it has put itself in a vulnerable spot with its ban on speech at town meetings. True, open meetings law allow towns certain “reasonable restrictions” to manage public comment periods. But from a journalist’s view, it will set a frightening precedent if elected officials are allowed to single out certain topics for censor, especially if those topics deal with matters of overwhelming public interest, such as shale gas development. Moreover, it’s an egregious act of bad faith when the censor targets citizens following accepted protocol in an open forum designed for their input.

Not surprisingly, the Town of Sanford speech ban is being challenged. The Natural Resources Defense Council and Catskill Citizens for Safe Energy filed a suit earlier this month asking the U.S. Court of the Northern District of New York to rule that the resolution banning fracking speech at Sanford Town meetings is a constitutional infringement because it “unlawfully bars plaintiffs’ members from speaking at Town Board meetings about a matter of substantial public interest that has generated significant political activity.” The town has until March 14 to respond to the complaint. The timing from there depends on the town's response and court's schedule, said Kate Sinding, an attorney for the NRDC.

The lawsuit against the Town of Sanford is one of many that will be playing out as various stakeholders chart new legal ground related to shale gas development. On the other side of the fence, lawyers are working on a suit on behalf of landowners, like Dewey Decker, who claim government is taking away their rights to develop natural gas under their land. As reported by Gannett’s Jon Campbell today, Dan Fitzsimmons, president of the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, said the group is looking for four people to serve as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the Department of Environmental Conservation. The action will argue that the state’s hold on shale gas permitting, pending the outcome of a health review with no timeline, amounts to an illegal “taking” of property rights. “The lawsuit against the state will focus on claims where the failure to grant (high-volume hydrofracking) permits has deprived landowners of all economically viable uses of their real property or interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations,” Fitzsimmons wrote to members.

The group is represented by Binghamton attorney Scott Kurkoski, who told Campbell “we’re now recognizing that the state has no intention of ever completing the SGEIS.” Kurkoski was referring to the Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement, the document that includes both the health and environmental reviews necessary to proceed. (DEC Commissioner said the review will be completed within weeks, although he would not say when or whether the state will begin issuing permits.) Kurkoski’s clients collectively own sizable parts of New York’s southern Tier that cover lucrative swaths of both the Marcellus and Utica shales. It’s where the controversy continues after four and a half years, and it will continue to keep lawyers busy into the foreseeable future.